Informer\u27s Privilege:  Should it be Recognized in Grand Jury Proceedings; Should it be Extended to Civic Anti-Crime Organizations, The by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 46 | Issue 6 Article 8
1956
Informer's Privilege: Should it be Recognized in
Grand Jury Proceedings; Should it be Extended to
Civic Anti-Crime Organizations, The
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Informer's Privilege: Should it be Recognized in Grand Jury Proceedings; Should it be Extended to Civic Anti-Crime Organizations,
The, 46 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 843 (1955-1956)
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Prepared by students of Northwestern
University School of Law, under the
direction of student members of the
Law School's Legal Publication Board
John A. Chernak, Editor
THE INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE: SHOULD IT BE RECOGNIZED IN
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS; SHOULD IT BE EXTENDED TO
CIVIC ANTI-CRIME ORGANIZATIONS?
Law enforcement agencies often rely upon
informer's reports as a basis for investigation
or the arrest of a person accused of a crime.'
Although it is a citizen's moral duty to report
violations of the law, the informer demands the
assurance of some protection, for he fears that
disclosure of his identity may expose him or
his family to retaliatory action for what he has
made known.2 As a result the courts have long
recognized, as an evidentiary rule, the privilege
of government officials to withhold the identity
of their informers. 3 It is not clear, however,
whether the informer's privilege extends to
grand jury proceedings, and, of equal impor-
tance, whether courts (or legislatures) should
extend this privilege to investigating officers
I See HOPKINS, OuR LAWLESS POLICE (1931);
Donnelly, Jvdicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE
L.J. 1091 (1951); Hoover, A Comment on the Ar-
tile "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58
YALE L.. 401 (1949).
See Comments, Some Aspects of Competency and
Privileged Communications in The Federal Criminal
Courts, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 730 (1950); An
Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administra-
tive Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953). The
dangers involved are best illustrated by the death
of Arnold Schuster. Shortly after New York police
disclosed that his information led to the arrest of
bank robber Willie Sutton, Schuster, the informant,
was mysteriously slain. N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1952,
p. 1, col. two; id., March 9, 1952, p. 1, col. 8.
3 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
"This privilege is well established, and its sound-
ness cannot be questioned."
of private civic anti-crime groups appearing in
grand jury or court proceedings.
Both of these novel problems were raised in
the cases of It re Kohn4 and People v. Kcating.5
In each case a member of a civic crime com-
mittee was cited for contempt of court for
refusing to disclose the source of his informa-
tion before a grand jury conducting a parallel
investigation. However, neither court specifi-
cally passed upon the question of the availa-
bility of this privilege before the grand jury.
6
4 277 La. 245, 79 S. 2d 81 (1955).
'286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st
Dep't 1955).
6 In the Keating case, the court recognized the
existence of the informer's privilege, but refused
to extend it to the counsel of a private organization,
in the absence of any statute specifically allowing
the court to do so.
The prevailing members of the court in the Kohn
case did not meet the issue of whether the privilege
was available in grand jury hearings-instead, they
apparently refused to acknowledge this evidentiary
rule even in courts of law. On the other hand the
decision may be grounded upon an interpretation
of the ordinance which authorized the creation of
the investigating committee. However, the con-
curring opinion recognized the validity of the privi-
lege in the courts, but specifically held that it could
not be invoked before grand juries. A dissenting
judge argued that this privilege was firmly estab-
lished. Furthermore, because the language of the
municipal ordinance which created this quasi-public
committee was not antagonistic to the privilege,
the dissenting judge felt Kohn had sufficient official
status to remain silent before the grand jury.
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Yet both legal and policy reasons support the
argument that if the informer's privilege is
worthy of recognition in courts of law, it should
also be extended to grand jury proceedings.
THE PRIVILEGE BEFORE THE CouRTs
Courts which recognize the informer's privi-
lege afford it a varying breadth of application;
some safeguard only the informer's identity,
7
while others will, in addition, protect the com-
munication itself.8 However, even under the
view which advocates shielding only the in-
former's identity, the contents of the communi-
cation are generally also held to be privileged
if their disclosure would reveal the informer's
identity. 9 Under neither view is it considered
to be an absolute privilege: if the informer's
identity is already known the privilege is not
available, 0 and if the identity of the informer
is necessary to the accused's defense in a crimi-
nal proceeding the court will require disclo-
sure," since the public interest in acquitting
the innocent is deemed to override the public
benefit derived from shielding the informer's
identity. A further basis for the latter qualifi-
cation is found in the accused's constitutiona1
7E.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938). Accord, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d
ed. 1940). UNIFORm Rm.Es OF EvIDENcE rule 36
(1942).
8 E.g., Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131
N.W. 124 (1911); Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360,
105 Pac. 537 (1909).
9 E.g., People v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135, 60 N.W.
457 (1894); McCoPcMC, EVrDENcE § 148 (1954).
'0 McCoRMxicK, EVIDENCE § 148 (1954): "[It is
obviousl that when the identity has already become
known to those who would have cause to resent the
communication, the privilege ceases." E.g., Com-
monwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 175, 165
N.E. 467, 470 (1928) (voluntary confession of a
crime).
" E.g., Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390
(3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F.
Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937). For criminal cases
sustaining the nondisclosure of the informer's
identity on the theory that it was not essential to
the accused's defense, see Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938) and United States v. Li Fat
Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
rights of confrontation and due process in
courts of law.
2
THE PRIVILEGE BEFORE THE
GRA JURY
Apparently the only privileges presently rec-
ognized before both courts and grand juries
are the privileges against self-incrimination,
13
against revealing state secretse4 and against
disclosure of communications between attor-
ney and client. 5 In addition to the constitu-
"2 See Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against The
Production of Data Within The Control of Executive
Departments, 3 VAo. L. REv. 73, 77 (1949) and
Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial
and Adininistrath'e Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206,
212-13 (1953). The Sixth Amendment guarantees
the accused's right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him and reserves to him the right
of cross-examination. Moreover, the Fifth Amend-
ment restricts the national government from de-
priving any person of his due process rights while
the Fourteenth Amendment protects any person
from state interference with these rights.
"3 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892) and State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 72, 9 A.2d
63, 69 (1939) hold that the privilege to refuse to
answer incriminating questions exists before grand
juries. A minority of courts also recognize a second
aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination-
the right of the accused to refuse to take the stand
in criminal prosecutions, as existing before grand
juries. State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S.D. 162, 257
N.W. 113 (1934), People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div.
665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (lst Dep't 1908). However,
a majority of the courts, under the theory that a
grand jury hearing is not a "criminal prosecution"
and that there is no "accused," have held that this
second aspect of the self-incrimination privilege
does not exist before investigatory bearings of grand
juries. In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 231
(1936); O'Connel v. United States, 40 F.2d 201
(2d Cir. 1930); Ex parte Barnes, 73 Tex. Crim. 583,
166 S.W. 728 (1914).
'1 Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
I5 Ex parle McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac.
566 (1915) (an attorney is privileged to refuse to
disclose the identity of his client to the grand jury).
People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail
of New York County, 150 Misc. 714,270 N.Y. Supp.
363 (Sup. Ct. 1934), which recognized the availability
of the attorney-client privilege before the grand
[Vol. 46
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tional mandate, a strong emotional feeling
against inquisitional tactics appears to be a
factor which gives support to the extention of
the self-incrimination privilege to all official
hearings where persons are called upon to give
testimony.' 6 Furthermore, the importance of
national security would seem to be a controlling
factor, not present when considering the in-
former's privilege, in justifying extention of the
state secret privilege to grand juries 7 But
although there is greater justification for ex-
tending the self-incrimination and state secret
privileges to grand juries, there does not seem
to be any compelling reason why the informer's
privilege should not be given recognition at
least coextensive with that afforded the attor-
ney-client privilege. Public policy considera-
tions underlying the latter are no more forceful
than those underlying the former, for both
privileges are primarily grounded upon a desire
to foster a full disclosure between the parties.18
jury as to communications. However, the identity
of the client was held not to be privileged and was
required to be divulged. Cf. In re Selser, 15 N.J.
393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954). Although the court ap-
parently acknowledged the existence of the at-
torney-client privilege before the grand jury, the
communication was made in furtherance of a crime
and was not privileged.
In addition, on a motion to quash an indictment
it was held to be error for the grand jury to admit
testimony shielded by the marital privilege. State
v. Marshall, 140 Minn. 363, 168 N.W. 174 (1918).
16 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892); McCoRMcK, EvIDENCE §§ 120, 122 and
123 (1954).
171t has been held that communications from
an informer to a government official may also be
protected by the state secret privilege. Worthington
v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872); cf. King v.
United States, 112 Fed. 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1902);
Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 11. App. 503, 509 (1930).
But the state secret privilege should apply only
when national security would otherwise be jeop-
ardized; it appears improper to classify the ordinary
informer's identity or his communication as a state
secret.
"8It should be noted that if the government
official to whom the informer communicated his
message is an attorney, the attorney-client privilege
may provide a basis for an alternate theory that
In addition to the foregoing consideration of
analogous privileges, 9 important policy argu-
ments are persuasive bases for extension of the
informer's privilege to be invoked in grand
can be relied upon to protect the informer's identity.
Vogel v. Gruas, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Ratzlaff v.
State, 122 Okla. 263, 249 Pac. 934 (1926); Gabriel
v. McMullin, 127 Iowa 426, 103 N.W. 355 (1905).
Contra, Vernon v. State, 49 Ga. App. 187, 174 S.E.
548 (1934). Cf. Granger v. Warrington, 8 I1. 299
(1846) (the privilege was denied, however, as the
identity of the informer was already known). The
approach that recognizes nondisclosure based upon
the attorney-client theory would seem to be un-
sound, for the latter privilege is sustained in order
to protect a private relationship. This interest is
not present when the lawyer is acting in the role of
a public official. Also, the attorney-client privilege
traditionally protects the contents of the communi-
cation and not the identity of the client, so again,
the analogy fails to be compelling. For cases holding
that the identity of the client is not privileged see
Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 284 (U.S.
1826); People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County
Jail of New York County, 150 Misc. 714. 270 N.Y.
Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra, Elliot v. United
States, 23 D.C. App. 456, 467 (1904); Ex parte
McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1915).
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313 (3d ed. 1940) suggests
there are exceptional circumstances where the
identity of the client will be considered part of the
confidental communication, i.e., the facts of each
case control.
19 A further analogy may be drawn from a typical
state "official communication" statute. E.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 622.11 (1950): "A public officer cannot
be examined as to communications made to him
in official confidence, when the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure."
In addition, California, Idaho, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, South Dakota and Washington have enacted
these statutes. Georgia has a similar provision.
Upon the basis of such a statute the informer's com-
munication was protected in State v. McClendon,
172 Minn. 106, 214 N.W. 782 (1927) and Anderson
v. State, 72 Ga. App. 487, 34 S.E. 2d 110 (1945).
However, it may be doubtful that government of-
ficials could withhold the identity of informers, since
the statutes only refer to "communications."
Quaere: Could the disclosure of his identity, by an
informer to a government official, be a "communica-
tion" within the spirit and language of the statute?
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jury proceedings to the same degree as before
courts of law. Even though the secrecy of grand
jury hearings is guarded by statute,20 it is un-
fortunate that as a practical matter, the pro-
ceedings are often far from secret.2 1 Thus, if
the informer has reason to believe that his
identity may be disclosed it will have a deter-
rent effect upon his willingness to inform. And
discouraging the informer will necessarily have
a prejudicial effect upon effective police inves-
tigation of criminal violations, the basic con-
sideration underlying the ancient informer's
privilege.n
Just as in courts of law, to the extent that
the shielding of an informer encroaches upon
the fundamental rights of an accused, a per-
suasive argument is made for denying any in-
former's privilege before grand jury proceed-
ings. 3 However, since an accused's rights are
The analogy is weakened, however, by the in-
dication that these statutes merely codify the exist-
ing state secret and informer's privileges. State v.
Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 Pac. 1000 (1909). See also
Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its LIse in Judicial
and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206,
219 (1953) and 8 WiGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2374
(3d ed. 1940).
20 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38 § 720 (1955): "No
grand juror... or other person shall disclose...
nor shall any grand juror during his term of service
communicate with any person concerning any
matter which the jury has considered, is consider-
ing or is about to consider .... Whoever violates
this section shall be imprisoned for not more than
one year."
21 Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony
Cases, 8 MINN. L. REv. 379, 389 (1924); Comment.
The Grand Jury (Specific Reference To Illinois), 44
J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 49 (1953).
2 The first reported case which recognized the
informer's privilege was Rex v. Akers, 6 Esp. 127,
170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790). For an exhaustive his-
torical development see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 3 and Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use
in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings. 63
YALE L.J. 206, 209 (1953).
23 Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.
1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1937). Accord, Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); United States v. Li Fat Tong.
152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
not guarded before the grand jury to the extent
that they are in courts of law, he would gain
little benefit, if any, by disclosure of the in-
former's identity before the grand jury. At the
present time a person has no right of cross-
examination or of confrontation when being
investigated or indicted by a grand jury.U The
denial of these rights, the denial of right to
counsel and the use of normally inadmissible
evidence in grand jury proceedings are held
not to violate the accused's constitutional right
of due process.
25
The foregoing considerations favor allowing
government officials to withhold the identity of
their informers from the grand jury, both in
investigatory and indictment proceedings, in-
asmuch as this privilege is firmly established
in courts of law.
26
THE PRIVILEGE AND Civic ANi'I-CRIME
ORGANIZATIONS
To invoke the privilege of nondisclosure in
courts of law, the person in whom the confi-
dence is placed is required to be a public official,
acting in the performance of his duties.n If an
anti-crime group is created by state statute to
be the investigating arm of the legislature,
then, as public officers, they would be entitled
21 Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th
Cir. 1942). The court held that the inquiry made
hy the grand jury was not a criminal prosecution
within the purview of the Sixth Amendment. See
note 12 supra.
25 U.S. v. Costello. 221 F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir.
1955) (hearsay evidence held sufficient to support
an indictment); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir.
1931) (witness before grand jury is not entitled to
aid of counsel); People v. Barbour, 152 Misc. 39,
273 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1934) (since
a grand jury serves merely an accusatory function
it was held unwise to invoke technical rules of
evidencel.
2G For a thorough analysis of the powers of a
grand jury see Comment. The Grand Jury-Its in-
vesti.,atory Powers and Limitations, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 586 (1953); The Grand Jury (Special Reference
To Illinois), 44 J. CRIM. L.. C. & P.S. 49 (1953);
Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Porwers,
17 F.R.D. 331 (1955).
27 See note 3 supra.
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to remain silent. A group whose creation is
authorized by municipal ordinance to investi-
gate corruption in a given community is farther
removed from the necessary degree of official
status required to sustain a reliance upon the
informer's privilege. However, depending upon
how broadly the ordinance delegated govern-
mental functions, this quasi-public organiza-
tion could logically be permitted to shield the
identity of its informers behind the privilege.s
But if the crime commission has a wholly pri-
vate status, without any governmental author-
ization or control over its membership, activi-
ties, or the selection of its staff, it seems clear
that special investigators hired by this private
group would not have the requisite official
status to invoke the common law privilege.
Since privately financed and operated civic
organizations (and in addition, some quasi-
public groups) do not fall within the traditional
scope of the privilege, a recent congressional
inquiry has sought to determine the need for
legislation to extend this rule of nondisclosure
to officers and directors of civic groups.n Legis-
latures, in evaluating whether there is any need
for another statutory privilege, must ascertain
whether the work of citizen organizations will
be more effective with such legislation or
whether the alleged need for this privilege is
only illusory.
2
1 E.g., the majority and dissent in the Kohn
case differed on this very point. Ordinance No.
18,531, section 5, of the City of New Orleans, in
describing the reporting duty of the investigative
committee, reads: ". . . Such reports shall first be
delivered to the ... Grand Jury... for such action
as that body shall consider proper."
The majority of the court did not feel that this
language permitted the invocation of this privilege
before the grand jury.
29 Senator Estes Kefauver, who has urged the
formation of citizens crime commissions, recently
introduced a resolution in Congress to study the
extent to which officers of anti-crime civic organiza-
tions may be required to divulge confidential sources
of information. S. Rzs. 91, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
101 CONG. REc. 3826 (daily ed. April 18, 1955).
This resolution was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee "to conduct an immediate study and
report promptly to the Senate body."
Civic crime commissions are not organized
to duplicate the work of any department of
the government; nor are they formed to appre-
hend or prosecute criminals. Instead, they seek
by observation and investigation to determine
why crime flourishes and prosecutions lag.30
Some merely gather statistics and data, but
the majority report to the public when there
are indications of lax and inefficient law en-
forcement. From their nature and function it
is reasonable to propose that civic anti-crime
groups should, when possible, limit their use of
informers to obtaining leads for investigating
unlawful activity. Because of their notoriously
untrustworthy character, information from in-
formants should be painstakingly checked for
accuracy. If each crime committee is able to
verify this data before publishing it, there
would be no need for a privilege of nondisclo-
sure. Facts independently corroborated by re-
sourceful investigation could then be presented
to the public, to local police or to the grand
jury, as the organization's own.n
However, these considerations are not rele-
vant in determining whether or not the civic
groups should also be required to disclose the
identity of undercover agents who either ini-
tially discover the information or verify the in-
former's disclosure. These investigators, many
of them formerly with the FBI, would be of
no use in further investigations after their
identity was disclosed.n Contrasted to an in-
30 The Chicago Crime Commission was the first
effective organization of its kind. For a discussion
of its creation and aims see Sims, Fighting Crime
in Chckago: The Crime Commission, 11 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 21 (1920). For an exhaustive analysis
of these citizen's groups see Peterson, CWiizens Crime
Commissions, 17 FED. PROB. 9 (1953).
31 Boudin v. Dulles, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1955,
p. 12, col. 3 (D. D.C. 1955) (memorandum opinion,
Youngdahl, J.). "Confidential information is of un-
questionable importance to executive officers in per-
forming their duties, but it should be confined for
use in obtaining factual data which may itself be
used of record." Id. col. 5.
3 The FBI itself is often faced with this very
problem. "BARTH, THE LoYALTY o FREE MEN
164 (1951) comments: "[In the Judith Coplon 1949
espionage trial] it embarrassed the government...
19561
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
former, an undercover agent usually does not
fear retaliation. Instead, his fear is grounded
primarily upon a destruction of his livelihood.
For this reason grand juries, as a practical
matter, often yield in their quest for the agent's
identity, and instead, settle for the testimony
of officers and directors of these groups.
POSSIBLE STATUTORY TREATMENT
Some of the problems involved in extending
the informer's privilege to private persons were
examined by states which considered statutes
that would grant a similar immunity to news-
men. ' Such statutes were necessary if a news-
man's privilege was warranted, since traditional
concepts of privileged communications unques-
tionably demanded that newsmen disclose the
identity of the source of their information.
These statutes have been criticized on the
ground that the public interest in guaranteeing
better news reporting is not better served by
fostering a confidential relationship between
reporters and their informants.M The effect of
because publication of the FBI files may have re-
vealed the identity of certain confidential and
stratgically placed informants-a high price to
pay for the punishment of a young woman who had
cese(l to be a danger as soon as her espionage ac-
tivities had been discovered . .."
x Alabama, Arizonia, Arkansas, California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have adopted
statutes extending some sort of privilege to news-
men. However, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin have rejected similar statutes.
It should also be noted that other statutes have
extended privileges to communications to some
private professional groups. E.g., Georgia protects
accountants, a Virginia statute applies to brokers
and Oregon has enacted a statute to protect com-
munications to stenographers.
34 Wigmore, in his earlier treatise, commenting on
the 1896 Maryland statute-the first newsman
confidence statute-said: "The following enactment,
as detestable in substance as it is crude in form,
will probably remain unique." 5 WiGmORE, Evi-
DENCE § 2286. n.7 (2d ed. 1923). See Notes, The
Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61
the newsmen statutes is to raise the newsman
to the level of a public official. Quaere: Whether
the interest of the community has really thereby
been subordinated to the interest of a rela-
tively small professional class. Prior litigation
has demonstrated that because of a rigid canon
of the journalistic code of ethics, even without
a statute, the newsman will accept the penalty
of contempt rather than disclose his source of
information.35 If his efforts to report all the
news does benefit the general public a strong
argument can be made for the position that he
should not be subject to contempt for such a
refusal. 6 However, it would seem that the
newsman's primary interest in obtaining a
statutory privilege is to gain a personal ad-
vantage, e.g., the obtaining of an exclusive
story by nondisclosure of his informant to
public officials, which seems to lead to the
conclusion that the newsman benefits from
these statutes rather than the general public.
The scope of newsmen confidence statutes
varies from state to state. A proposed New
York statute qualified the privilege to the ex-
(1950); Gallup, Further Consideration of a Privilege
for Newsmen, 14 ALBANY L. REv. 16 (1950). Contra.
Desmond, The Newsmen's Privilege Bill, 13 ALBANY
L. REv. 1 (1949).
35 Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781
(1911); People ex rd. Mooney v. Sherrif, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See note 34 supra.
36 Newsmen contend that the public interest in
better news reporting will be fostered by these
statutes, i.e., the newsman will be free tc expose
corruption without fear of citation for contempt.
Motivations for abuse of such statutes are ad-
mittedly present. For example, a reporter may with-
hold information (which law enforcement officials
should have) in order to keep 'open' an exclusive
story, or for some personal reasons not consistent
with the public interest. Manifestly, however, it
cannot be contended that all newsmen who have
suffered imprisonment in lieu of disclosing a con-
fidential source of information have been motivated
by considerations inconsistent with furtherance of
the public interest. This being so, there is no public
policy which would support penalizing a newsman
for promoting the public interest, recognizing that
his actions incidently also benefit his occupational
position.
[Vol. 46
CRIMINAL LAW CISE 'OTES .ND COIMENTS
tent that the reporter could disclose the source
of his information in his discretion, yet he
could not be compelled to do so unlcss the
court found the disclosure was essential to the
public interest.Y The latter qualification would
seem to be the only way in which a legislature
would be justified in extending a privilege of
nondisclosure to civic anti-crime organizations.
Such a flexible and contingent limitation prob-
ably would not deter informers; nor would it
discourage the use of undercover agents by the
organization. However, this discretionary qual-
ification would seem to be burdensome upon
the trial courts, inasmuch as "public interest"
is not susceptible of precise definition.
Moreover, there are other overriding con-
siderations. It is conceivable that an informer's
privilege statute could be used by an unscrupu-
lous investigator to operate a purportedly
reputable anti-crime endeavor and in this way
threaten officials with public disclosure of fic-
titious informer's information, always under
the shield of a statute which would compel
disclosure only after the exercise of a value
judgment by a trial court judge of what is
"in the public interest." By contrast, however,
those public officials who warrant attack often
criticize the source of such an attack to harass
and thus negate the effectiveness of the civic
organizations, and have the additional purpose
of forcing disclosure of the identity of the
informer in order to retaliate against him.
The public interest would not be benefited
greatly by statutory protection of these civic
groups. In thosefew instances where informer's
leads could not be verified by the organization,
a statute would protect a-private anti-crime
group from harassment;3s but the work of these
citizen organizations would not be .far more
effective with such legislation. Furthermore, it
" Law Revision Commission Report, Leg. Doc.
No. 65(A) (1949). See also People v. Keating, 286
App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1955).
31 E.g., an informer may be a witness to, or par-
ticipant in, the bribing of a civic official. The in-
former's observation could be the only evidence of
that illegal transaction. By contrast, the report of
the existence of a gambling establishment could
easily be verified for authenticity.
also would be impractical for legislatures to
extend the informer's privilege so that civic
anti-crime groups could refuse to reveal the
identity of their undercover agents. There
would be no way for a court to ascertain
whether the civic group's information was
from an undercover agent or an informer.
Therefore, unscrupulous anti-crime organiza-
tions, who are not subject to the control of a
responsible superior, could gain the benefits
of such a statute merely by telling the court
that the informer's information was the prod-
uct of capable undercover work. Therefore, in
balancing the considerations previously set
forth, a statute would not seem justified.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the courts should allow an
extension of the informer's privilege in grand
jury proceedings to the same extent that it is
recognized when government officials appear as
witnesses before courts of law. On the other
hand, full consideration compels the conclusion
that neither the courts nor the legislatures
should allow private anti-crime groups to refuse
to disclose the identity of their informers. The
results of such a conclusion may appear harsh
at first, since private investigators and officers
of these anti-crime commissions must reveal
the source of their information or face punish-
ment for contempt. However, the interest of
the public will be better served without any
statutory protection inasmuch as civic anti-
crime commissions will then be compelled to
gather a sufficient amount of probative evi-
dence, independent of the informer's disclosure,
before making their charges. In those few in-
stances where this would not be possible it
would devolve upon the civic group to balance
the severity of the crime against the possible
loss of undercover agents or the discourage-
ment of informers. In doing so, the organiza-
tions, which through previous work have estab-
lished a good reputation in the community,
will know that they will often be successful in
convincing a grand jury, as a practical matter.
